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Top commercial banks seemed to have  weathered the debt crisis.
It remains to be seen whether their current strength and stability
will help re-establish normal credit relationships between pri-
vate banks and the developing countries.
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To what extent can commercial banks absorb  new money packages and at the same time to
loan losses from the less-developed countries  withstand the accounting consequences of such a
(LDCs)?  Some losses by private creditors are  move.
likely to be part of any resolution of the debt
crisis, and such losses are implicit in some of the  Some form of debt forgiveness may in
many proposals for dealing with the crisis.  practice lead to a quicker resumption of private
capital flow: wo  the LDCs and increased invest-
Bank stQck  prices for U.S. commercial  ment in the developing countries.  But such
banks already reflect a high discount on (and the  flows may never again reach the avalanche
low quality of) developing country debt - so no  proportions of the 1970s, which resulted from
major U.S. bank is likely to fold if it gets a  the unique coincidence of sluggish economic
return on its LDC debt consistent with the prices  growth in the OECD, large OPEC surpluses, and
of LDC debt on the secondary market.  The top  a number of regulatory changes in the creditor
banks in Canada, France, Japan, the United  countries that directed ban 1' lending overseas.
Kingdom, and West Germany are less heavily
exposed to LDC debt than their U.S. counter-  It may take time, but thrugh  a combination
parts - and thus correspondingly less imperiled  of self-interest and public policy the current
by the debt crisis than the U.S. banks.  impasse in the debt crisis should be overcome.
This may be done pardy through large-scale debt
The relative safety of most of the top  swaps sponsored by private or public agencies.
creditor banks renders their insistence on full  Debt swaps are already being implemented
servicing of the LDC loans less urgent and  bilaterally in small steps and through a variety of
should in principle open the door to partial debt  instuments,  including debt conversions and
forgiveness.  It also, however, enables the banks  buybacks.
to boycott the by now routine schedulings and
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The last  six years have not seen the gradual diminution of the
developing  country  debt  crisis  that  many  observers  had  predicted  and  hoped
for.  Instead,  third  world  indebtedness  has  remained  high - in  fact  the
ratio  of medium  and  long  term  debt  to  GNP  has  gone  up from  50.1  per  cent  in
1985  to 53.7  per  cents  in  1987  for  the  set  of  highly  indebted  countries. At
the  same  time,  real  economic  growth  in the  developing  countries  has  proven
disappointing  - at lukewarm  rates  of 3.0  and  2.5  per  cent  in 1985  and  1987
for  the  same  group  of countries.'  As the  current  debt  strategy  of
'muddling  through'  appears  unlikely  to  produce  a timely  and  satisfactory
outcome  of the  debt  crisis,  it is  warranted  to  discuqs.  and  explore  other
avenues. This chapter  brings  to  any  such  discussion  an account  of the
experience  of the  main  creditor  banking  systems  with  LDC  debt.
A main  question  the  chapter  attempts  to answer  is  to  what extent  the
commercial  banks  at  present  could  possibly  absorb  LDC loan  losses. Some
losses  by private  creditors  are  likely  to  be a  part  of any  resolution  of the
debt  crisis  in  the  years  to  come,  and  such  losses  are  implicit  in some  of
the  many  proposals  for  dealing  with the  debt  crisis. Extending  earlier  work
by Sachs  and  Huizinga  [1987],  the  chapter  finds  that  bank stock  prices  to a
large  extent  already  reflect  the  low  quality  of LDC  loans,  and  that  thus  no
:iajor  U.S.  bank is  likely  to fold  if  it gets  a return  on its  LDC  debt  from
now  on that  is  consistent  with the  prices  of LDC  debt  observed  in the
secondary  market. Major  banks  in  other  creditor  countries,  such  as Canada,
France,  Germany,  Japan  and  the  United  Kingdom,  are  shown  to  be less  heavily
exposured  to the  developing  countries  than  the  top  U.S.  banks. Thus these
banks  turn  out  to  be even  less  imperiled  by their  LDC  portfolio's  than  the
1U.S.  banks.
The  relative  safety  of almost  all  the  top  creditor  banks  renders  their
unfailing  insistence  on full  servicing  of the  LDC  loans  less  urgent  and  less
appealing,  and in  principle  it could  open  the  road  to  partial  debt  forgive-
ness.  However,  it also  enables  the  banks  to  boycott  the  by now  routine
reschedulings  and  new  money  packages,  and  at the  same  to  withstand  the
accounting  consequences  of such  a move.  Some  form  of  debt forgiveness  may
turn  out  to  be conducive  to  a resumption  of private  capital  flows  to the
LDC's  and increased  investment  in the  developing  countries  - although  such
flows  may  never  again  reach  the  avalanche  proportions  of the  1970s,  which
resulted  from  a unique  coincidence  of sluggish  economic  growth  in  the  OECD,
large  OPEC surpluses,  and  a  number  of regulatory  changes  within  the
creditor  countries  that  directed  bank  leading  overseas. 2
Commercial  bank  debt  constitutes  the  largest  part  of LDC  debt  and  it is
in  some  ways the  most  difficult  to  grapple  with - both  because  of the  large
number  of individual  borrowers  and lenders  and  because  some  of the  relevant
information  is  private. In 1987  commercial  bank claims  on LCD's  stood  at $
644  billion,  which  is  approximately  57  per  cent  of a total  LDC  external  debt
of $  1,130  billion. As shown  in  Table  1, $  257  million,  which  is  somewhat
less  than  half  of all  commercial  bank  lending  to LDC's,  is  concentrated  in
Latin  America,  with smaller  commercial  bank indebtedness  of $  125  billion  in
Asia  and  $  61  billion  in  Africa.
Of the  total  bank  debt  of $  644  billion,  $  290  billion  or roughly  45
percent  is owed  by a relatively  small  number  of 17 so-callad  highly  indebted
countries. A  breakdown  of the  debt  owed  by these  highly  indebted  countries
is  given  in  Table  2.  The  table  shows  that  of the  17 countries  Brazil  and
2Mexico  stand  out  with  commercial  bank  obligations  of $  81 and  $  74  billion
respectively.  These  17  highly  indebted  countries  are  those  problem  debtors
with  rather  large  absolute  amounts  of debt  bank;  they  do  not include  debtor
nations  such  as  Liberia  and  Sudan  that,  although  they  have small  absolute
exposures,  are  beyond  solvency  by most  people's  standards.
On the  creditor  side,  LDC  exposure  is  highly  concentrated  within  a few
countries  as  well.  The  distribution  of LDC  loans  among  the  major  craditor
banking  systems  is reported  in  Table  3.  The  U.S  banks  are shown  to  be the
largest  creditor  group  to the  developing  countries  with  combined  claims  of
$ 129  billion  at the  end  of 1987,  which  amounts  to about  20  per  cent  of
total  commercial  bank  loans  to the  LDC's,  down  from  24  per  cent in  1985.
The  United  Kingdom  and  West  Germany,  on the  other  hand,  have  seen  their
exposures  to the  LDC's  grow  somewhat  during  the  last  4 years,  to  16 and  8
per  cent  of total  LDC  bank  debt in  1987  respectively.  Absent  from  the  list
of creditor  nations  in  Table  3 is  Japan,  as  her combined  LDC  exposure  is not
known  precisely. Williamson  (1988]  puts  the  Japanese  proportion  of LDC
commercial  bank  debt  at 12  per  cent  for  1986.
A major  factor  behind  the  drop  of the  relative  importance  of  U.S.  bank
exposure  to the  LDC's  has  no doubt  been  the  depreciation  of the  dollar  since
1985.  If  German  bank loans  to the  developing  countries,  for  instance,  are
primarily  denominated  in  Deutsche  marks,  then  their  dollar  value  rises  if
the  dollar  depreciates  vis-a-vis  the  mark.  The  impact  of the  dollar
depreciation  on the  relatively  importance  of  bank  creditors  can  easily  be
checked  by converting  the  dollar  commercial  bank  debt figures  of Table  3
into  the  creditor  nations'  own  currencies.  Such  converted  exposure  numbers,
as reported  in  Table  4, show that  from  1983  to 1987  British  and  German  LDC
3bank  claims  have  risen  even  when  measured  in  pounds  sterling  and  D-marks.
Since  1985,  however,  all the  main  creditor  banking  systems,  except  Italy's,
have  been  succesful  in reducing  their  own-currency  LDC  exposure.
The  balance  of this  chapter  is  organized  as follows. Section  2 review
recent  developments  in the  secondary  market  for  LDC  loans. It shows  that
secondary  market  prices  have  been  on a  relentless  downward  path,  and  it
presents  some  sketchy  evidence  on the  volume  of secondary  market  trading  of
LDC  loans. Section  3 looks  more  closely  at the  recent  experience  of the
U.S.  banking  system  with their  LDC  debt,  extending  and  updating  the  work  on
this  issue  in  Sachs  and  Huizinga  (1987]. As noted,  a main  conclusion  that
emerges  is that  the  solvency  of the  U.S.  banks  appears.  not in  jeopardy  at
present  on account  of LDC  debt. Section  4 replicates,  as far  as possible,
the  analysis  for  the  non-U.S.  banks. If anything,  the  major  non-U.S.
creditor  banks  are  shown  to  be even  less  endangered  by their  LDC  exposure
than  their  U.S. counterparts.
Some  understanding  of the  regulatory  environment  in  which  commercial
banks  now  operate  is  necessary  to  be able  to  construct  and  evaluate  any
plans  for  action  and  reform.  The  tax,  accounting  and  regulatory  treatment
of  LDC  exposure  continues  to  differ  widely  internationally,  even  as
proposals  for  harmonizing  bank  capital  requirements  across  nations  are
being  ratified. Some  fe+.tures  of the  creditor  nations'  tax  and  accounting
rules  as they  relate  to  LDC  debt  are  summarized  in  section  5.  Section  6
concludes  the  chapter.
42.  The  secondary  market  for  LDC  loans
The  secondary  market  for  LDC  loans  can  fulfill  a  nu.Lber  of useful
purposes. It allows  banks  to reshuffle  their  portfolio's  of LDC  debt  or to
exit  from  LDC  lending  altogether,  and  it facilitates  the  execution  of debt
conversion  schemes. Ever  sinc.  secondary  market  prices  of LDC  loans  were
made  available  a few  years  ago, hey  have  tended  to  fall.  Table  5
summarizes  the  downward  trend  or secondary  market  prices  in recent  years  for
27 troubled  debtor  countries. Columns  1  and  2 give  the  secondary  market  bid
prices,  as quoted  by Salomon  Brothers  for  March  11,  1986  and  for  June  9,
1988  Column  3  calculates  the  percentage  change  in  the  secondary  market
price  betwee.i  the  two  dates,  and  it shows  that  secondary  market  prices  have
fallen  during  the  last  2  years  for  all  27  countries  except  Bolivia  and
Turkey. Of course,  claims  on  Bolivian  debt  only  regained  some  of their
value  from  a depth  of 6 cents  to  the  dollar  on  news that  Bolivia  offered  to
repurchase  its  debt  for  11 cents  on the  dollar  in  early  1988. This  buy-back
scheme,  which  was financed  with  donated  funds  and  completed  in  March  1988,
was  not  a reflection  of the  strength  of the  Bolivian  economy  but  rather  of
the  generosity  of some  donor  governments.  Turkey  also  has traditionally
been  a large  recipient  of outside  aid.  Barring  these  exceptions,  secondary
market  prices  thus  appear  to  indicate  that  the  market's  perception  of the
debtor  countries'  ability  to  service  and  repay  the  debt  has gradually
worsened.
Secondary  market  spreads  between  bid  and  ask  prices  differ  widely
across  countries,  indicating  substantial  differences  in  the  liquidity  of the
loans  of the  various  debtor  countries. Column  4 of the  table  reports  the
mean  values  of the  spread  relative  to the  bid  price,  computed  as the
5difference  between  offer  and  bid  prices  divided  by the  bid  price. This  mean
spread  data is  based  on 48 separate  price  quotations,  with about  2  week
intervals,  during  the  period  from  March  11,  1986  to  June  9, 1988.  Discarding
the  fluke  of a mean  spread  of 290  per  cent  for  claims  on Sudan,  our
computations  show  that  the  mean  spread  ranges  from  1  per  cent  for
negotiable  Turkish  loand  to 55  per  cent  for  rather  shaky  Nicaraguan  loans.
Mean spreads  are 2  or 3 per  cent  for  the  major  Latin  borrowers  of  Argentina,
Brazil,  Chile  and  Mexico.
To explain  movements  in  secondary  market  prices,  Sachs  and  Huizinga
regress  the  secondary  market  price  on the  following  explanatory  variables:
debt  relative  to  GNP, the  growth  rate  of real  GNP,  dwnmy  information
reflecting  a country's  interest  payment  record  and  information  on  whether  or
not its  loans  have  been  judged  'value-impaired'  by U.S.  bank  regulators.
Using  the  growing  evidence  on secondary  market  price,  it is  now  possible  to
test  for  the  role  of an additional  factor:  country-specific  uncertainty  as
reflected  in the  volatility  of the  secondary  market  prices  themselves.  As
in indicator  or price  volatity,  we take  the  standard  error  of auxiliary
regressions  of the  bid  price  on a linear  time  trend  for  each  country.
The  results  of a regression  which  includes  this  standard  error,  denoted
SE,  as an  explanatory  variable  are  reported  in  Table  6.  Other  included
explanatory  variables  are  ARR,  which  is  a dummy  variable  set  equal  to 1 if
the  country  has commercial  bank  arrears  as  of July  1988,  public  debt
relative  to  GNP,  and  again  the  growth  rate  of real  GNP.  Public  debt  rather
than  total  debt  relative  to  GNP  is included,  as secondary  market  quotations
in fact  primarily  reflect  the  value  of public  sector  obligations.  The
coefficient  on the  SE  variable  is  negative  and  statististically
6significant,  which  suggests  that  country-specific  unce)tainty  indeLd  tends
to  depress  secondary  market  prices.
While  LDC  loan  prices  have  dropped,  the  secondary  market  trading  volume
has  risen  substantially.  Using  data  provided  by jalomon  Brothers,  Merrill
Lynch  and  the  IMF,  the  World  Bank  has  managed  to  piece  together  some
estimates  of trading  volume  since  1984  for  a  number  of debtor  countries,  as
reflected  in  Table  7.  Data  for  the  years  1984,  1985  and  1986  represent  only
debt  conversion  transactions,  defined  as debt  for  equity  swaps,  domestic
debt  swaps  and  debt  repurchases.  In 1987  the  heaviest  secondary  market
trading  was in  Mexican  bank  debt  at  $  4.8  billion,  followed  by trading  in
Chilean  debt. Overall  trading  volume  grew  rapidly  ftom  a  mere  estimated  $  2
billion  in 1984  to a  projected  trading  volume  of $  35  billion  for  all  of
1988.
As an additional  measure  of liquidity,  one  can  relate  the  estimated
volume  of trading  in  a country's  debt  to  the  total  of its  commercial  bank
obligations.  Such  measures  of relative  trading  activity  are  reported  in
Table  8.  Apparently  in 1987  Chilean  debt  was traded  most intensively  with
trading  equalling  26  percent  of indebtedness  . Oddly  enough,  the  last
column  of the  table  shows  that  during  the  first  half  of 1988  56.8  per  cent
of Bolivian  bank loans  changed  hands,  which  no doubt  reflects  the  Brazilian
debt  buy-back  of  March  1988. Relative  trading  in  Jamaican  loans  during  the
first  half  ci 1988  was  also  quite  robust  at  20.3  per  cent.
To some  extent  secondary  market  volumes  reflect  and  parallel  the  debt
conversion  and  debt  buy-back  schemes  put  in  place  by the  various  debtor
countries. The  pick-up  of trading  of  Argentinian  bank debt  in 1987,  for
instance,  may  be ia  anticipation  of  Argentina's  debt  conversion  project
7which  was formally  announced  on  January  29,  1988.3  The  scheme  calls  for  a
total  of $1.9  billion  in debt  to  be put  up for  auction  and  converted  'n  the
next  5  years. Countries  that  alrea4'  had debt  conversion  plans  installed
prior  to 1987,  such  as Chile  and  Brazil,  announced  further  expansions  of
their  schemes  in the  form  of equity  funds  to  be capitalised  with the
proceeds  of converted  bank loans  and  to  be invested  in  t.ational  industries.*
Finally,  in 1987  the  Philippines  set  out  to relax  its  rules  for  its  existing
debt-equity  swap  program  following  criticisms  that  the  program  was  slow  and
stuck  in red  tape. 5
3.  The  U.S.  bank  experience
The  U.S.  banking  system  remains  the  single  largest  national  group  of
private  creditor  banks  of the  developing  countries,  despite  its  relative
decline  in the  ranks  of LDC  creditor  banking  systems. As shown  by Table  9,
there  has  also  been an absolute  decline  in  U.S.  bank  exposure  from  a total
of $  128.3  billion  at year-end  of 1982  to  $  100.2  billion  at the  end  of
1987.6  The table  shows  that  U.S.  banking  claims  on  private  LDC  borrowers
have  declined  from  $  83.2  billion  at  year-end  of 1982  to $  39.9  billion  at
the  end  of 1987,  while  over  the  same  period  U.S.  banking  exposure  to  public
institutions  has in fact  risen  from  $  45.1  billion  to $  60.3  billion. As
discussed  in Sachs  and  Huizinga,  a  number  of factors  can  account  for  the
pronounced  relative  decline  of the  U.S.  bank  exposure  to private  borrowers
in the  LDC's. New  money  in the  form  of  concerted  lending,  for  instance,  has
primarily  been  extended  to governments.  Also,  the  public  sectors  in
developing  coountries  have liberally  b,anted  official  guarantees  to
previously  contracted  private  sector  debt. Finally,  so far  write-offs  of
8private  debt  have  been  more  extensive  than  of public  debt.
A second  but  weaker  trend  that  is  evident  from  the  table  is  the
continuing  concentration  of LDC  exposure  within  the  large  money-center
banks. The  share  of LDC  loans  by money-center  banks  has increased  from  64
percent  at the  end  of 1982  to  67  percent  of the  total  by 1987. Apparently
the  smaller  banks  have  not  made  any  wholesale  efforts  to cut  their  LDC
exposure  through  the  secondary  market. Banks  in  all  size  categories,
however,  have succeeded  in lowering  their  absolute  LDC  exposure  since  1982.
As the  few  largest  U.S.  banks  are  shown  to  hold the  bulk of the  LDC
loans,  it is  warranted  to examine  each  of then  in some  more  detail. The
LDC  exposure  of the  10 largest  banks  in the  United  Sgtes are  given  in  Table
10.  Citicorp  tops  the  list  with  an LDC  loan  portfolio  of over  $  13  billion,
fellowed  by BankAmerica  with loans  totaling  roughly  $  10  billion. The 6
banks  with  the  largest  LDC  exposure  together  hold  $  62.1  billion  in  LDC
loans,  which  is approximately  half  of  the  total  LDC  exposure  of the  U.S.
banks.
To gain  some  insight  into  these  banks'  vulnerability  to  LOC  debt,  it is
useful  to relate  their  LDC  exposure  to  measures  of  bank resources. The
last  3 columns  of Table  10  relate  the  banks'  developing  country  exposures  to
total  bank  assests,  primary  capital  and  shareholders'  equity  net  of loan
loss  reserves. When  dividing  LDC  exposure  by shareholders'  equity,  we take
the  LDC  exposure  net  of the  LDC  loan  loss  reserve. 7 Whichever  of these  3
measures  of relative  LDC  exposure  one  chooses,  the  top  4  banks  in decreasing
order  of exposure  are  Manufacturers  Hanover,  BankAmerica,  Chase  Manhattan
and  Chemical  Bank.  Manufacturers  Hanover  and  BankAmerica  show  high ratio's
of LDC  exposure  to shareholders'  equity  of 2.63  and  2.45  respectively,  even
9when  LDC  exposure  is  adjusted  for  the  already  set  aside  LDC  loan  loss
reserves. Citicorp,  the  nation's  largest  bank  by assets,  has  a relatively
secure  LDC  exposure-to-equity  ratio  of 1.13.
The top  U.S.  banks  have  strengthened  their  LDC  loan  loss  reserves
aggressively  during  1987. Additions  to LDC  loan  loss  reserves  for  the  major
10  banks  are  reported  in  Table  11.  This  intensified  loan  loss  provisioning
came  in two  distinct  waves  during  the  second  and  fourth  quarters  of the
year. The first  wave  was  heralded  by Citicorp's  bellwether $3  billion
addition  to its  loan  reserves  on May  19,  1987,  which  established  an informal
industry-wide  LDC  loan  loss  reserve  coverage  standard  of 25  per  cent,  soon
to be emulated  by other  money-center  banks. Bank  of Bpston,  which  set  off
the  second  wave  of reserving  in  mid-December  1987,  took  the  loan  loss
coverage  ratio  well  beyond  the  25  per  cent  resistance  point. However,  this
time  the  equity  poor  money-center  banks  were  not  able  to follow  suit.
As the  table  shows,  money-center  hank  write-offs  of LDC  debt  were
modest  in  1987. Write-downs  as  a percentage  of LDC  outstandings  for
Citicorp  and  BankAmerica,  for  instance,  were  merely  1.6  and  2.3  per  cent.
Some  of the  banks  with smaller  exposure,  however,  decided  on far  more
aggressive  write-offs.  On January  13,  1988  the  American  Express  bank,  for
instance,  wsote  off  all  of its  private  sector  LDC  loans.
The impact  of  debt  reduction  schemes  on  bank  stock  prices
Debt  reduction  schemes  are  likely  to  produce  some  book  losses  on the
part  of the  commercial  banks. Losses  arise  if  the  current  risky  LDC  loans
are  swapped  for  higher-quality  assets  with  lower  face  value  such  as cash.
Despite  the  implied  book losses,  such  swaps  ms.y  in  principle  benefit  or harm
10the  banks  depending  on the  valuation  of the  financial  instruments  they  get
in  exchange  for  their  LDC loans. To arrive  at  an informed  guess  as to  how
debt  reduction  schemes  that  involve  asset  swaps  affect  the  banks,  it is
first  necessary  to  infer  the  current  value  of  LDC  debt  to the  banks,  as
reflected  in  bank stock  prices.
The  value  of LDC  debt  implicit  in  bank  stock  prices  can in  principle
differ  from  the  explicit  discounts  observed  in  the  secondary  market  for  a
variety  of reasons  such  as tax  considerations,  federal  deposit  insurance  and
the  deficiencies  of the  secondary  market  itself. Sachs  and  Huizinga  show,
however,  that  the  explicit  discounts  observed  in the  market  and the
discounts  implicit  in  bank  stock  prices  move  togethef.fairly  closely  for  the
period  1982  to  mid-1987. An updated  estimate  of the  discount  on  LDC  debt
implicit  in  bank stock  prices  first  follows.
U.S  banks  are  required  to disclose  their  loan  exposure  to  any  one
foreign  country  if it  exceeds  1  per  cent  of  book  assets. Using  such
publicly  available  information,  it is  possible  to  construct  a reasonably
complete  picture  of the  exposure  of  about  40 large  banks  to the  five  major
Latin  borrowers,  i.e.  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Me-ico  and  Venezuela.
The  regression  equation  that  yields  us an  estimate  of the  LDC loan
discount  implicit  in  stock  prices  is specified  as in  Sachs  and  Huizinga. 8
It is  first  premised  on the  identity  that  the  market  value  of a  bank's
assets  should  be equal  to the  market  value  of its  liabilities  and  of its
equity. The  market  value  of a  bank's  liabilities  can  reasonably  be
approximated  by its  book  value,  as  most  of a  bank's  liabilities  are in  fact
rather  short  term  financial  instruments  sach  as customer  deposits. To
facilitate  the  data  gathering  effort,  the  market  value  of  preferred  equity
11is  also  proxied  by its  book  value. Assets  are  taker,  to be assets  reported
on the  balance  sheet  to the  exclusion  of off-balance  sheet  assets  such  the
bank's  contingent  claim  on the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation. Some
of the  limitations  of this  omission  are  discussed  in  more  detail  below.
Letting 0.  and  °2  stand  for  the  market  values  of  one  dollar  of  LDC loans
and  of  one  dollar  of  non-LDC  assets,  we can  now  write  the  balance  sheet
identity  as follows
MVe  + BVp  + BV1 - OlAide  +  2A.
where
MV 0 - market  value  of common  equity
BVp  - book  value  of  preferred  equity
BV 1 - book  value  of liabilities
Aldc  - book  value  of  LDC loans
A0 - book  value  of  other  assets
Both  sides  of the  above  expression  can  be divided  by a  bank's  total
assets,  denoted  by  At,t, 0 which  gives  the  following  equation  to  be
estimated.
MV 0 + BVp + BV 1 Alde
Atatal  _  a  +  0  p
Atotalitt- tot&L
where
a  - °2
e  °1  - 02
In  the  above  equation,  a  is  again  the  market  value  of one  dollar  of
non-LDC  assets,  and  p  is the  discount  of  LDC loans  vis-a-vis  non-LDC  asets
implicit  in  stock  prices. The  above  equation  is  estimated  using  bank stock
12prices  for  two  separate  dates:  May  31,  1987,  and  also  November  31,  1987.  In
practice,  the  A,,,  variable  is  limited  to  bank loans  to  Argentina,  Brazil,
Chile,  Mexico  and  Venezuela. 9 The  regression  results  are  reported  in  Table
12.  Note that  the  constant  term,  which  is  an  estimate  of the  market  value
of a  bank's  non-LDC  assets,  is  very  close  to 1 in  both  regressions.  The
estimate  of the  LDC  discount 0  is  54  percent  for  November  31,  1987  and  a
somewhat  higher  62  per  cent  for  May  31,  1988.
Unfortunately  the  estimate  of the  discount P  is  likely  to  be biased,
as the  Ald,  variable  only  measures  loan  exposure  to the  big  five  Latin
debtor  nations. In  particular,  the  estimated  discount  is  likely  to  be
larger  than  the  real  discount  if  a  bank's  exposure  to the  big  Latin  five  is
positively  correlated  with  Its  other  LDC  bank  exposure. To adjusz  for  the
bias,  we need to  know  that  U.S.  banks  exposure  to the  Latin  five  amounted  to
67 per  cent  of the  total  LDC  exposure  of U.S.  banks  at  year-end  of 1987.10
If it  were true  that  each  bank's  exposure  to the  five  Latin  borrowers  were
perfectly  correlated.  with  other  LDC  exposure,  then  an  unbiased  estimate  of
the  discount  would  be 67  per  cent  of 62,  or  41.  The  correct  discount
probably  lies  in  between  41 and  64  per  cent.
Using  estimates  of the  implicit  discount  thus  constructed,  it is
possible  to simulate  the  stock  price  effect  of any  exchange  of the  banks'
LDC  loans  portfolio  for  cash  or other  securities.  Let  6i  be the  estimated
implicit  market  discount  so  that  a  bank's  LDC  exposure,  denoted  Exp,
currently  contributes  (1  - 6j)Exp to  a  bank's  stock  market  value. Let  us
further  assume  that  the  bank  sells  or exchanges  its  LDC  loans  at a discount
6'.  or equivalently  that  it  receives 1 - 6.  dollars  in  cash  or  marketable
securities  for  each  dollar  of  LDC loans. Let  T  denote  the  bank's  marginal
13corporate  income  tax  rate. As realized  loan  loxses  are  tax  deductible,  the
debt  exchange  will reduce  the  bank's  tax  liability  by  6,,r.  Adding  up,  we
see  that  the  transaction  has  changed  the  bank's  market  value  MV  by
dMV  - [1  - 6, +  6.r  - (1  - 6,)]  - [6,  - 6*(l  - r)JExp
The initial  market  value  of a  bank,  KV,  can  be calculated  as the
product  of the  number  of stocks  outstanding  and the  common  stock  price.
Using  the  above  expression  for  the  change  dWV  resulting  from  the  debt  swap,
we see  that  the  relative  change  in  a  bank's  stock  market  value  is simply
given  by
dMV  (6,  - 6*(l  - r)]Exp
-s  MV
This expression  thus  predicts  the  change  in  a bank's  stock  price
following  a debt  swap  of the  variety  described  above.
Let  us take  the  implicit  discount 6,  to  be 0.41,  which  as  discussed
above  is the  lower  bound  for  our  regression  estimate  of  6,.  As the  above
expression  shows  that  the  relative  stock  price  change dNV/MV is positively
related  to the  value  of the  implicit  discount 6,,  setting 6  equal  to
0.41  will give  us lower  bounds  for  the  estimates  of the  relative  stock
market  changes  resulting  from  debt  swaps.
The  relative  stock  price  change  can  easily  be evaluated  for  any  number
of individual  banks  and  different  values  for  the  variables 6.  and  r.  As
a benchmark  case  for  the  sale  discount G.,  let  us take  the  volume  weighted
discount  observed  in the  secondary  market  as of  June  9, 1988,  although  there
is  no deep reason  why  actual  debt  swaps  should  be transacted  at the  concur-
14rently  observed  secondary  market  prices. For  the  purpose  of illustration,
however,  secondary  market  prices  will  suffice. As of June  9, 1988,  the
average  secondary  market  discount  for  the  27  countries  in  Table  5  weighted
by the  exposure  of  all  U.S.  banks  at year-end  of 1987  was  exactly  50  per
cent.
There  is some  further  ambiguity  as to the  appropriate  tax  rate  r, as it
is  not  clear  to  what  extent  banks  will  in fact  be able  to  write  off  loan
losses  against  taxable  income. After  the  tax  reform  act  of 1986,  the  top
corporate  rate  was  reduced  to  34  percent.11 However,  in  practice  banks  may
be abLe to  reduce  their  tax  liability  by less  than  34  percent  of loan  losses
if  they  have  insufficient  past,  present  or future  ta4able  income  to  deduct
realized  loan  losses  from. At present,  banks  are  allowed  to carry  such
losses  resulting  from  bad  debt  back  for  10  years,  while  they  can  carry  such
losses  forward  for  5  years. 12 The  banks'  potential  to  carry  loan  losses
back should  be fairly  easy  to  assess,  as it is  known  how  much tax  they  have
actually  paid  in the  recent  past.
Corporate  income  taxes  paid  by each  the  10  major  U.S.  banks  for  the  5-
year  period  1983-1987  are  reported  in  Table  13.  The  table  also  calculates
these  taxes  paid  as a share  of each  bank's  LDC  loan  exposure. Note  that  a
write-off  of  half  of the  LDC  debt (as  in implicit  in  a 50  per  cent  sale
discount)  can  at  most  reduce  a  bank's  tax  liability  by the  tax  rate (i.e.,
34  percent)  times  50  or 17  cents  per  dollar  of  debt.  Citicorp  and  Morgan
are  shown  to  have  paid  taxes  equivalent  to  25 and  27 per  cent  of LDC
exposure,  and  thus  appear  to  have  sufficient  loan  loss  carry-back  potential
to realize  all  the  potential  tax  benefits  from  LDC  loan  write-offs.  Judging
from  the  table,  Manufacturers  Hanover,  First  Chicago,  and  especially
15BankAmerica  have  somewhat  more  limited  loan  loss  carry-back  capabilities.
However,  as loan  losses  can  be spread  out  for  tax  purposes  over  15  years
(rather  than  only  5  years),  it  appears  that  all  banks  can  realize  sizeable
tax  benefits  following  LDC  debt  write-offs.
The final  piece  of information  we  need is  estimates  of the  top  10  banks'
market  capitalizations,  MV,  as reported  in  Table  14.  The  second  column  of
the  table  divides  LDC  loan  exposure  by market  capitalization  to  arrive  at
values  of the  ratio  Exp/MV.1 3 At this  point  we have  all  the  information
necessary  to  evaluate  stock  price  changes  resulting  from  a debt  swap. The
discount 6,  is taken  to  be 0.50  throughout.  As there  remain  some
ambiguity  what the  appropriate  tax  rate  is,  and  we do the  evaluations  for
four  different  values  of the  tax  rate:  0.34,  0.20,  0.15  and  0.  The  results,
tabulated  in  Table  17 indicate  that  for  tax  rates  of  0.34  and  0.20  all  10
major  banks  will see  there  stocks  rise  in  value,  while  for  tax  rates  of 0.15
and  0 stock  prices  for  all  banks  go  down. Not  surprisingly,  the  stock
prices  of the  most  heavily  exposed  banks  (such  as BankAmerica  and
Manufacturers)  are  most  affected  by any  swap.
Using  the  expression  for  dMV/MV,  we can  also  derive  the  threshold  sale
discount 6.  that  causes  a  bank to  have  a zero  market  value  for  any  given
tax  rate  r.  In symbols,  this  critical  discount  is found  by setting  dKV/MV
equal  to  -1.  The  table  reports  these  border  line  discounts 6,  for  the
top  10  banks  for  each  of the  tax  rates  0.34,  0.20,  0.15  and  0.  Obviously,
the  higher  the  tax  rate  r  the  larger  the  discount 6,  that  a  bank can
sustain  without  reaching  zero  market  value. The table  shows  that  with  a tax
rate  of 0.34  only  BankAmerica  and  Manufacturers  Hanover  will reach  the
folding  point  for  unrealistically  high critical  discounts  of 88 and  86 per
16cent  respectively.  Even  for  the  hypothetical  case  of zero  tax  rates,  which
implies  there  is  no tax  deductibility  of loan  losses,  only  a limited  number
of  banks  can  theoretically  reach  the  zero  value  mark  for  critical  discounts
that  in  all  cases  are  larger  than  the  currently  observed  average  secondary
market  discount  of 50  per  cent. This  indicates  that  little  short  of the  LDC
loans  becoming  completely  worthless  can  push  the  major  U.S.  banks  over the
edge.
How  costly  are  any  such  debt  reduction  scheme  to  the  U.S. tax  payers  in
the  form  of foregone  tax  receipts? These  costs  can  easily  be computed  as
6,rEXP. For  a total  U.S.  bank  exposure  of $  100.2  billion  from  Table  9, the
U.S.  Treasury  would  forego  about  $17  billion  in  tax  revenue. It is  not
clear,  however,  whether  any  coordinated  large  scale  debt  swap  will  greatly
affect  total  foregone  tax  receipts  over  time. As a  number  of developing
countries  certainly  won't  be able  to service  their  debts  fully  under  any
circumstances,  the  U.S.  banks  will  register  LDC  loan  losses  at some  point  no
matter  what.  Perhaps  the  major  effect  of  a large  sell-off  of LDC  debt  by
the  banks  is that  write-offs,  which  would  otherwise  be spread  out  over  many
years,  are  bunched  at the  time  of the  swap.
Caveats
As noted  earlier,  the  specification  of regression  equation  that  yields
our  estimate  of the  implicit  discount  does  not  capture  the  valuation  of a
bank's  off-balance  sheet  assets  such  as the  value  is  off-balance  sheet
banking  operations  and  the  bank's  contingent  claim  on the  Federal  Deposit
Insurance  Corporation.  There  are  two  reasons  why the  value  of the  latter
claim  may  be expected  to  rise  as the  value  of  LDC loans  declines: (1)  there
17will  be a  widening  gap  between  the  fixed  priced  deposit  insurance  and the
true  or actuarial  value  of deposit  insurance  and (2)  bank  regulators  may
prove  to  be reluctant  to  actually  close  down  the  very large  banks,  certainly
if they  become  troubled  all  at the  same  time;  this  means  that  a  bank,  which
is  practically  insolvent,  will  still  have  a  positive  chance  of making  a
return  and  thus  a positive  market  value.14
Consistent  with this  observation,  Brickley  and  James [1986]  find  that
there  was a significant  decrease  in the  co-movement  of savings  and  loans
stock  rbturns  with the  returns  of the  underlying  assets  held  by these
institutions  following  a relaxation  of  regulatory  rules  regarding  when
savings  and  loans  institutions  are  to  be closed. Thus  the  regulatory  safety
net  may  partially  mitigate  the  impact  of larger  actual  or expected  LDC  loan
losses  on  bank stock  prices,  and  thus  the  numbers  in  Table  17  may overstate
any  negative  impact  of debt  swaps  on bank  stock  returns. As a related
matter,  Unal  and  Kane [1987]  show  that  the  relationship  between  off-balance
sheet  assets  (including  federal  guarantees)  and  interest  rates  has  been
unstable  and  changed  sign  during  the  1975-1986  period.
The  value  of FDIC  insurance  to a  bank  is  uncertain  not  only  because
bank  regulators  have  considerable  latitude  in  deciding  when to  close  down  a
bank,  but  also  because  it is  uncertain  to  what  extent  the  FDIC  will  protect
the  banks'  deposit  holders,  debt  holders,  and  shareholders  in  case  of a
bank failure. While  FDIC  insurance  only  guarantees  deposits  of  under  $
100,000,  the  FDIC  in some  cases  has  protected  and  reimbursed  all
depositors.  In fact,  all  depositors  in  both the  failures  of Continental
Illinois  in  1984  and  of First  RepublicbankBank  in 1988  were fully  paid  off.
In federal  bailouts,  bank  bondholders  have  also  received  settlements
18ranging  from  100  per  cent  to  virtually  nothing  as in the  recent  First
RepublicBank  case.
There  are  a  also  couple  of reasons  why  debt  swaps  and the  implied  loan
losses  can  negatively  influence  the  return  to  bank shareholders  that  are  not
quantified  in  our  regression  equation  either. First,  the  realization  of
loan  losses  implies  adverse  announcements  of company  earnings,  which  have
historically  tended  to  produce  negative  stock  price  reactions. Second,  the
fall  in  book  capital  that  follows  the  realization  of loan  losses  may  prompt
more  frequent  and  costly  bank  examinations  by the  regulatory  agencies.
Third,  a shortage  of  bank  capital  may  force  the  bank to issue  additional
stock,  which  dilutes  and  negatively  influences  the interest  of the  original
stock  holders. Table  17  understates  any  potential  negative  impact  of debt
swaps  on stock  prices  to the  extent  that  these  effects  are  sizeable.
The  Brazilian  moratorium
Banks  remain  to some  extent  vulnerable  to the  vicissitutes  of  LDC  debt,
as  was  shown  by the  Brazilian  interest  moratorium  announced  on February  20,
1987. Using  the  event  study  method,  Sachs  and  Huizinga  have shown  that  the
announcement  o- interest  moratorium  by Brazil  adversely  affected  bank stock
prices. Using  the  same  technique,  Bruner  and  Sims [1987]  had earlier  shown
that  bank  stock  returns  have  been  negatively  affected  by the  announcement
by  Mexico  in  August  1982  that  it  could  not fully  service  its  debt.  Ozler
[1988]  finds  that  debt  reschedulings  also  materially  affect  bank  stock
value. Brazil's  interest  suspension  was the  major  impetus  behind  Moody's
decision  to  downgrade  the  credit  ratings  of most  of the  major  banks  - among
them  Citicorp,  BankAmerica,  and  Chase  Manhattan  - in  early  December  1987.
19As Moody  put it,  there  was  a "rsduced  commitment  of borrowers  to  austerity
programs"  and  a  "sharp  fall  in  secondary  market  prices  for  third  world
debt.".s
Negotiations  that  eventually  lead  to the  cessation  of the  moratorium
intensified  in  October  1987  with the  aim  of  warding  off  a decision  by U.S.
bank regulators,  meeting  in  Washington  from  October  26,  to  reclassify
Brazilian  loans  as "value-impaired".  Such  a downgrading  would  make  it  much
more  difficult  for  Brazil  to  obtain  additional  credit,  as private  creditors
would  have to  reserve  immediataly  at least  10  per  cent  for  any  new  loan  to
Brazil. Throughout  the  negotiations,  Brazil  continued  to  make  concessions
to the  banks. The  bank stock  return  regression  in  Table  16,  which  spans  the
period  from  December  15,  1987  to  May 31,  1988,  reveals  that  the  outcome  of
the  negotiations  was far  better  for  the  banks  than  bank stock  investors
could  have  hoped  for. The  positive  coefficient  of 0.612  indicates  a
significant  revaluation  of Brazilian  loans  during  the  preceding  half  a  year.
In  a parallel  fashion,  the  seconda.y  market  price  for  Brazilian  loans  rose
from  a low  point  of 38  cents  on  October  6, 1987  to  54.5  cents  on  May 26,
1988.1E
Despite  the  large  transfer  of  wealth  from  the  Brazil  to the  banks
implicit  in the  resurgence  of  bank stock  prices  after  October  1987,
president  Sarney  of Brazil  publicly  confessed  that  the  moratorium  had  been
a  mistake  in early  February  1988,  at the  time  Brazil  made its  first  post-
moratorium  interest  payment  of $350  million. Sarney  said  that  the  interest
suspension  had caused  Brazil  to  miss  out  on interest  rate  reductions
accorded  to  other  debtor  countries,  and  that  financial  flows  from  the
country  had  grown,  while  inward  investment  and  export  credits  from  foreign
20governments  had  stagnated."'  These  immediate  drawbacks  of the  moratorium
no doubt  are  real  enough,  but  their  magnitude  appears  negligiba  compared  to
the  massive  transfer  of  wealth  implicit  in  the  rise  in  bank stock  prices  and
the  surge  in the  secondary  market  price  of Brazilian  debt  after  the
moratorium  had  ended.
4.  Maior  non-U.S.  creditor  banks
Non-U.S.  creditor  banks  hold the  majority  of commercial  bank  claims  on
LDC's. Japan  and the  Europan  countries  have  banking  systems  that  are  highly
concentrated  within  a few  large  banks,  which  in  principle  could  made  these
banking  systems  more  vulnerable  to  LDC  debt  than  the  U.S.  banking  system.
Unfortunately,  the  major  non-U.S.  banks  aren't  subject  to the  stringent
disclosure  requirements  that  apply  to  U.S.  banks,  and  thus  data  on,  for
instance,  the  LDC exposure  of individual  banks  is  more  restricted.
Exposure  data for  the  main Canadian  and  British  banks,  however,  has  been
fairly  well  publicized.  The  LDC  portfc,lio's  of German,  French  and  Japanese
banks,  however,  are  still  strictly  off-the-record.  Interestingly,  it is  the
banking  systems  with relatively  low  LDC  exposure  that  have restricted  public
access  to LDC  exposure  data. Maybe  this  reflects  the  fact  that  low-exposure
banks  wish  to conceal  their  true  exposure  - and  the  fact  that  LDC  exposure
poses  no threat  to them  - to strengthen  their  b&rlaining  position  in the
rescheduling  arena.
As exposure  data  for  only  a few  top  non-U.S.  banks  - and  then  only  to
Brazil  and  Mexico  - is  available,  it is  not  possible  to  estimate  the
discounts  on LDC  debt  implicit  in  bank  stock  prices  for  the  non-U.S.
creditor  banking  systems  individually.  Implicit  discounts  can  in principle
21differ  internationsllly  for  a number  of reasons,  such  as international
differences  in  taxation  and  accounting  practices. LDC  debt  write-offs,  for
instance,  are  more  valuable  to  banks  in  high-tax  countries  than  to  banks  in
low-tax  countries,  because  in the  former  write-offs  imply  more  sizeable
reductions  in the  banks'  tax  liabilities.
As it is  not  possible  to  estimate  implicit  LDC  discounts  independently
for  each  of the  creditor  countries,  our  approach  is instead  to see  how
heavily  exposed  the  top  non-U.S.  banks  are  (relative  to  bank  resoirces)
compared  with their  U.S.  counterparts.  The  non-U.S  creditor  creditor
nations  we examine  are  Canada,  France,  Germany,  Japan  and the  United
Kingdom. The  LDC  exposure  of these  countries'  top  banks  to  Brazil  and
Mexixco  relative  to  either  bank  assets,  equity  or market  capitalization  on
the  whole  turns  out to  be lower  than  for  the  top  U.S.  banks  on the  whole.
Trusting  that  implicit  discounts  on LDC  debt  and  tax  provisions  aren't  too
dissimilar  across  countries,  we can  reasonably  conclude  that  the  non-U.S.
banks  are  in  less  danger  of crumbling  under  the  weight  their  LDC
portfolio's  than  the  U.S.  banks.
The  high  degree  of  concentration  of LDC  debt  in  Europe  and  Japan  is
apparent  from  Table  17,  which  computes  the  Mexican  exposure  of  a country's
top  five  banks  as a share  of the  country's  banking  system's  total  exposure
to  Mexico. 18 The  numbers  indicate  that  Mexico's  bank  debt  is even  more
heavily  concentrated  among  a few  banks  in the  United  Kingdom,  Canada,  France
and  West  Germany  than  in the  United  States. In  Japan  the  five  major  banks
hold  a still  impressive  39  percent  of the  country's  commercial  bank exposure
to  Mexico. These  numbers  warrant  a focus  the  creditor  nations'  major  banks.
22Information  on each  of the  individual  banks  in  the  major  creditor
countries  is  provided  in  Table  18.  Column  1  shown  the  banks'  ratios  of
equity  to total  assets. This  simple  measure  of capital  adequacy  shows  that
the  major  British  and  Canadian  banks  are  on  average  as  well  capitalized  as
the  chief  American  banks. The  top  Japanese  and  French  banks,  however,  have
rather  low  average  equity-to-assets  ratio's  of 2.3  and  2.6  per  cent
respectively.  These  banks'  equity  falls  well  short  of the  4 per  cent
minimum  standard  for  shareholders'  equity  as a percentage  of risk  assets
that  will  be in force  in  each  of the  creditor  nations  mentioned  here.19
Columns  2 and  3  of the  table  state  the  banks'  exposure  to  Mexico  as a
percentage  of total  assets  and  as a  percentage  of  bank  equity. Columns  4
and  5 do the  same  for  the  banks'  combined  exposure  to Brazil  and  Mexico,  as
far  as the  data  allows.
The  numbers  show  that  only  Lloyds  and  Midland  banks  in  the  United
Kindom  and  the  Bank  of  Montreal  in  Canada  are  as heavily  exposed  to  Brazil
and  Mexico  as the  top  U.S.  banks. Note  that  exposures  relative  to  assets
for  the  top  Japanese,  French  and  German  banks  are  substanstially  lower.
Japanese  exposures  relative  to  bank  resources  have  no doubt  declined
substantially  in  recent  years  as  Japanese  banks  have  expanded  rapidly,
partly  because  of the  appreciation  of the  yen.  As of  year-end  1987,  all  of
the  world's  10 largest  banks,  based  on deposits,  were  in fact  all
Japanese.  20
How  would  the  major  non-U.S.  banks  fare  if their  debt  were  sold  at a
discount  as  part  of a debt  reduction  scheme? The  answer,  as in the  case  of
the  U.S.  banks,  depends  on
(1)  the  current  LDC  discount  implicit  in  bank stock  prices,
23(2)  the  potential  tax  benefits  of  write-offs,
(3)  the  extend  of exposure  relative  to  bank  market  capitalization,
(4)  the  operation  of deposit  insurance  and  other  regulatory  safeguards.
Information  on  bank  exposure  (to  Brazil  and  Mexico)  relative  to  market
capitalization  is  easily  computed. Table  19  gives  this  information  for  the
top  British,  Canadian  and  Japanese  banks  for  which  data  is  available. If  we
are  willing  to assume  that  implicit  LDC  discounts  and  tax  regulations
aren't  too  different  across  countries,  then  we know  from  our  previous
discussion  that  a debt  swap's  impact  on bank  stock  returns,  dMV/MV,  is
proportional  to the  ratio  of LDC  exposure  to  market  capitalization,
Exp/MV  . Table  19 shows  that  exposure-to-market  value  ratio's  tend  to  be
lower  for  the  British,  Canadian  and  especially  the  Japanese  banks  than  for
the  top  U.S.  banks. In fact  LDC  exposures  relative  to  market
capitalizations  are  virtually  nil  for  the  top  Japanese  banks. Thus  it
follows  that  cash  sales  of  LDC  debt  affect  bank stock  prices  of  British,
Canadian  and  Japanese  banks  less  than  the  stock  prices  of  U.S.  banks.  Only
the  stock  price  of Midland  Bank  in  the  United  Kingdom  would  be affected  to
about  the  same  extent  as those  of the  top  U.S.  banks. For  the  Japanese
banks,  the  debt  crisis  can  at  best  produce  a small  ripple  in  bank stock
returns  prices. If the  many  short-cuts  that  underly  this  reasoning  are
accepted,  then  we can  conclude  that  the  major  non-U.S.  banking  systems  are
even  less  jeopardized  by the  debt  crisis  than  the  U.S.  banking  system.
As in  the  United,  deposit  insurance  in  the  other  major  creditor  nations
may  mitigate  the  link  between  stock  returrs  and  the  value  of LDC  debt.  A
1977  European  Community  directive  requires  the  Community's  member  countries
to establish  deposit  protection  schemes. 2 1 As a response,  the  1979  Banking
24Act  in the  United  Kingdom  provides  partial  deposit  protection  for  deposits
up to  10,000  pounds  sterling. To pre-empt  such  legislation  in Germany,  the
German  private  commercial  banks  established  their  own  deposit  protection
scheme  in 1976. The  scheme  is  not  well-funded  and  relies  on the  support  of
the  contributory  banks  in  case  of  a major  bank  failure. Previously,  deposit
protection  was established  in  Japan  in  1977. The  Japanese  protection  fund
is  also  small  and  offers  only  limited  protection  to individual  depositors.
Thus  while  the  European  countries  and  Japan  do have  deposit  insurance,  the
coverage  and  subsidies  inherent  in  these  schemes  appear  to  be small  compared
to  federal  deposit  insurance  in the  United  States.
5.  Taxation.  accounting  and  other  regulations
Banks  are  subject  to  a  variety  of tax,  accounting  and  other  regulatory
provisions  that  directly  affect  the  profitability  of their  foreign  loans,
and  thus  their  ability  to  weather  the  debt  crisis. As these  regulations
have  evolved  independently  at the  national  level,  they  tend  to  vary  widely
internationally.  This  r^.ulatory  diversity  makes  it  difficult  even for  the
banks  among  themselves  to reach  a consensus  as to  how  best to resolve  the
debt  crisis. Indeed,  differences  in the  responses  of  U.S.  and  Japanese
banks  to,  for  instance,  Mexico's  early  1988  proposal  to exchange  some  of its
bank  debt  for  bonds  can  be traced  partly  to  differences  in  accounting
rules. As large-scale  LDC  debt  writa-offs  would  cut  deeply  into  a  bank's
capital  and  its  ability  to  continue  business  as  usual,  willingness  on the
part  of the  banks  to  embrace  any  such  scheme  depends  in  part  on wether  it
involves  substantial  write-offs. In the  case  of the  Mexican  offer,  the
Japanese  Ministry  of Finance  ruled  that  Japanese  banks  did  not  have to  write
25down  the  value  of  Hexican  loans  remaining  on the  balance  sheet. Moreover,
the  Finance  Ministry  was  expected  to allow  the  inclusion  of loan  losses
stemming  from  the  conversion  into  tax  calculations. 22 The  Security  and
Exchange  Commission,  on the  other  hand,  stated  that  increases  in  loan  loss
reserves  or  write-downs  of remaining  Mexican  debt  were  required. As a
result  the  Japanese  banks  were  relatively  enthusiastic  about  the  Mexican
deal.
An important  way in  which  bank regulators  affect  a  bank's  ability  to
weather  its  LDC  debt  situation  is  through  minimum  capital  requirements.
Recently,  12 countries  agreed  upon  common  capital  standards  to  be adopted  by
1992  within  the  framework  of the  Basle  Committee,9n  Bank  Regulations  and
Supervisory  Practices. 33 The  goal  of the international  harmonization  of
capital  requirements  is to iron  out  competitive  inequities  across  boundaries
that  arise  from  different  capital  requirements  across  countries,  and  to
create  an "even  playing  field"  internationally.
As was the  case in  the  individual  countries,  the  new  capital  adequacy
rules  are  based  on the  book  values  of  capital  and  assets. The  agreed
minimum  capital  standard  is  8  per  cent  of risk  assets. At least  half of the
bank  capital  has  to consist  of shareholders'  equity,  retained  earnings  or
noncumulative  preferred  stock. The  remainder  can include  undisclosed
reserves,  asset  revaluation  reserves  (only  45  per  cent  of  unrealized  gains
can  be counted),  loan  loss  provisions  (up  to  a  maximum  of 1.25  per  cent  of
risk  assets),  and  various  hybrid  capital  instruments  and  subordinated
debt. 24  These  various  provisions  represent  negotiated  compromises  that
reflect  pre-agreement  international  differences  in the  definition  of  bank
capital. The  partial  qualification  of unrealized  holding  gains  as  capital,
26for  instance,  is  meant  to  accommodate  the  Japanese  financial  institutions
that  at present  carry  substantial  unrealized  gains. The  partial  gearability
of loan  loss  reserves,  on the  other  hand,  assists  the  French  and  U.S.  banks
that  at present  can  count  loan  loss  reserves  towards  capital.
According  to news  reports,  the  new  capital  standards  call  for
substantial  rises  in  capital  for  the  Japanese  and  French  banks,  while  the
U.K.  banks  would  not  see  significant  changes  in  their  present  position. 25
The  Japanese  banks  are  estimated  to  have to  come  up  with an  additional  $35
billion  in  capital  by 1992. Federal  Reserve  Board  officials  in the  United
States  hinted  that  5  unidentified  U.S.  banks  need  an extra  $  12 to  $  15
billion  in  additional  capital  by 1992  to  be in  compliance  with the  newly
adopted  standards. 26 As noted,  if  new  capital  guide  lines  cause  bank
capital  to  be in  short  supply,  then  banks  may  prove  to  be more reluctant  to
write  off  their  LDC  loans,  and  participate  in debt  reduction  schemes  that
involve  write-downs  beyond  current  reserving  levels. A dearness  of capital
will  more generally  limit  the  banks'  ability  to  provide  new  lending  at  home
at  well  as abroad.
The  Basle  agreement  also  provides  for  rules  regarding  the  risk-
weighting  of assets  which  could  prove  as important  to the  developing
countries  as overall  capital  requirements.  The lower  risk  weighting
attached  to  lending  to  OECD  government  (including  Saudi-Arabia)  than  to
lending  to  non-OECD  governemnts  could  discourage  banks  from  extending  credit
to the  public  sector  debt  in  developing  countries. The  equal  risk-weighting
of  private  sector  debt  in  OECD  and  non-OECD  countries  alike,  however,
precludes  a  bias in  bank lending  to  either  developed  or developing
countries.
27Unfortunately  uniform  international  capital  standards  and  risk
weightings  of assets  by themselves  do  not  guarantee  fair  international
competition  among  the  banks. Given  the  persisting  international  diversity
in tax  and  accounting  practices,  the  harmonization  of  capital  standards  in
itself  is  as likely  to exacerbate  as to alleviate  unfair  banking
competition.  The  continuing  international  discrepancies  in  tax  and
accounting  practices  may  also  have some  unintended  and  unforeseen
consequences  for  the  banks'  debt  crisis  management  other  than  unfair
interbank  competition. Banks  may,  for  instance,  use  the  secondary  market
for  LDC  loans  to  rearrange  their  international  LDC  loan  portfolio's  in an
effort  to arbitrage  international  differences  in  tax  And accounting  rules.
The  secondary  market  can  thus  be a  vehicle  for  directing  LDC  loans  to those
countries  where  they  carry  the  greatest  tax  relief  to the  banks.  If this
were  to  happen,  then  the  tax  payers  of the  various  creditor  countries  would
face  rather  unequal  burdens  in  foregone  corporate  income  tax  receipts.  At
this  point,  direct  evidence  that  the  banks  are  in  fact  reshuffling  their  LDC
portfolio's  via  the  secondary  market  to  reap  maximum  tax  benefitts  is  not
available. The  evidence  on the  aggregate  exposures  of creditor  banking
systems  in  Tables  3  and  4, however,  is  suggestive.  German  banks,  which  in
recent  years  have  expanded  their  LDC  exposure  relative  to other  creditors,
indeed  enjoy  a favorable  tax  treatment  of LDC loan  loss  provisions  and,  as
discussed  below,  have  a correspondingly  high  LDC  loan  loss  reserve  coverage.
As the  debt  crisis  unfolds,  tax  and  accounting  rules  are  gradually
crystalizing  where  there  is  still  uncertainty.  Experiments  such  as the
recent  Mexican  offer,  whether  succesful  or not,  help  to force  bank
regulators  to  provide  regulatory  clarity,  and  to state  explicitly  what  until
28then  was only  informal. The  banks  themselves  are  important  participants  in
this  evolution  of regulatory  practices. Citicorp's  $  3  billion provision
for  loan  losses  in  May  1987,  for  instance,  set  an implicit  LDC loan  loss
reserve  coverage  standard  of 25  that  was  quickly  followed  by other  major
banks. Regulators,  when  enunciating  new  rules,  no doubt  often  look
attentatively  at  what leading  banks  and  accounting  firms  have  already  been
practicing.
The  major  features  of accounting  and tax  regulations  regarding  loan
loss  provisioning  in the  chief  creditor  nations  are  surveyed  in  Table  23.
The  first  column  indicates  the  current  levels  of provisioning  in  the  major
creditor  nations. Of the  7  national  banking  groups,  t,he  German  banks  appear
to  have  reserved  most  heavily  against  LDC  loan  losses,  while  Japanese  banks
stands  out  for  their  low  level  of provisioning.  The second  column  of the
table  summarizes  whether  and  to  what  extent  provisioning  has  been  mandatory.
France  and  Germany  have  not  prescribed  any  binding  guidelines  as to the
appropriate  level  of  provisioning  for  LDC  loan  losses. In the  United
States,  the  bank  regilatory  bodies  require  a loan  loss  reserve  level  of at
least  10  per  cent  for  a number  of countries  whose  loans  have  been  declared
"value-impaired."  Canada,  Japan,  Switzerland  and  the  United  Kingdom,  on the
other  hand,  have  drawn  up rather  elaborate  matrices  of  countries  for  which
reserving  is  necessary  and the  corresponding  minimum  provisioning  levels.
Banks  generally  have already  reserved  beyond  the  mandatory  reserving  levels,
especially  in  West-Germany.  Deutsche  Bank  AG, for  instance,  had  set  aside
reserves  for  70  percent  of its  LDC  loans  as of September  1987  according  to
its  chief  Afred  Herrhausen. 27
At least  partial  deductibility  of loan  loss  provisions  for  corporate
29income  tax  purposes  is  allowed  in  all the  major  creditor  nations  except  the
United  States. The  Japanese.  however,  limit  the  tax  deductibility  of
provisioning  to just  1  per  cent  of rescheduled  debt  or inceased  exposure.
A final  regulatory  issue  is  whether  loan  loss  reverves  are  counted  towards
bank capital. As summarized  in  the  last  column  of the  table,  loan  loss
reserves  currently  do  not  qualify  as regulatory  bank  capital  in  Canada,
Germany,  Switzerland  and  the  United  Kingom. In  Japan  only  1  percent  of
rescheduled  debt  or increased  exposure  can  be reckoned  as capital. At
present  France  and the  United  States  allow  loan  loss  reserves  to  be fully
counted  towards  bank  capital. As noted  the  Basle  agreement  will introduce  a
limited  role  for  loan  loss  reserves  as capital  in  all  the  major  creditor
nations  by 1992.
6.  Conclusion
This  chapter  has  examined  the  experience  of commercial  banks  in  a
number  of creditor  nations  with developing  country  debt.  For  the  case  of
the  U.S.  banks,  we find  that  at  present  bank stock  prices  already  reflect  a
high  discount  of LDC  debt. Thus  the  stock  prices  of  U.S.  banks  are  not
expected  to fall  if the  banks  get  a return  on their  LDC  loans  roughly
consistent  with  the  prices  for  LDC  loans  currently  observed  in the  secondary
market. This in  fact implies  the  banks  bave  weathered  the  debt  crisis.
The  top  banks  in  Canada,  France,  Japan,  the  United  Kingdom  and  West-Germany
are  shown  to  be equally  or less  heavily  exposed  to LDC  debt  than  their  U.S.
counterpart,  and thus  to  be correspondingly  less  imperiled  by the  debt
crisis  than  the  U.S.  banks.
It remains  to  be seen  whether  the  commercial  banks'  current  strength
30and  stability  will  prove  to  be helpful  in  reestablishing  normal  credit
relationships  between  the  private  banks  and  the  developing  countries. While
it  may take  time,  a combination  of self-interest  and  public  policy  should  in
the  end  be able  to  overcome  the  current  impasse  in  the  debt  crisis. Large
scale  debt  swaps  sponsored  by some  private  or  public  agency  is one  means
that,  as  we have shown,  the  banks  can  withstand  very  well.  At present,  the
same  strategy  is  already  implemented  bilaterally  in  small  steps  and in  a
variety of guises  such as debt conversions and debt buy-backs.
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32Table  1.  Comercial bank  debt  of  developing  countries
by geographic  region  at the  end  of 1987
(billions  of  U.S.  $).
Africa  61.2
Latin  America  256  .6
Asia  134.8
Middle  East  58.2
Other  Europe  49.7
Eastern  Europe  84.0
All  LDC  borrowers  644.4
Country  data  source:  BIS,  Quarterly  Release. Country  groupings
are  the  World  Bank's  and  based  on the  geographical  breakdown  as
used  by the  OECD.
33Table  2.  Comercial bank  claims  on the  highly  indebted  countries






Costa  Rica  0.9










*  Yugoslavia  10.0
Total  292.2
Source:  BIS,  Quarterly  Release.
34Table  3.  Distribution  of  LDC  bank loans  among  creditor
nations (billions  of U.S. $).
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
United  States  142.2  137.2  133.5  128.8  (Q4)
United  Kingdom  89.4  89.1  100.8  104.8  105.1  (Q3)
Germany  26.9  25.5  34.7  44.8  54.7  (Q4)
France  55.8  59.2  65.2  65.2  (Q3)
Switzerland  13.4  16.6  19.4
Italy  5.8  7.1 (Q2)
Total  563.4  601.8  644.4  (Q4)
Sources:  National  statistical  publications,  as reported  in the
'Financial  Flows  to Developing  Countries,  Quaterly  Review,'  September
1988,  World  Bank.  The  data  is  on a territorial  basis  and  non-
consolidated.  The  large  numbers  for  the  U.K.  may reflect  LDC lending
by  branches  of non-U:.K.  banks  located  in  London. The  U.S.  data is
from  the  Department  of the  Treasury.
35Table  4.  Distribution  of LDC  bank  loans  among  creditor  nations
measured  in  billions  of  the  creditor  countries'  currencies.
1983  1984  1985  1986  .1987
United  States  (S)  142.2  137.2  133.5  128.8  (Q4)
United  Kingdom  59.0  66.7  77.8  71.5  65.0 (Q3)
(pounds)
Germany  (DM)  68.8  72.7  102.0  97.3  93.3  (Q4)
France  (FF)  487.8  532.0  451.7  392.7  (Q2)
Switzerland  (SW)  31.3  40.9  34.9
Italy  (lires)  8713.7 9162.9  (Q2)
Sources  as for  Table  3.
36Table  5.  Secondary  market  prices  and  spreads.
Country  Bid  Price  Bid  Price  Perc.  Mean  Relative
at 3/11/86  at 6/9/88  Change  Spread
Argentina  64  26  -59  3
Bolivia  5  11  120  24
Brazil  75  52.5  -30  2
Chile  67  60  -10  3
Colombia  84  65  -23  3
Costa  Rica  53  11  -79  12
Dom.  Republic  45  20  -56  9
Ecuador  68  27.5  -60  5
Honduras  40  22  -45  10
Ivory  Coast  74  28.5  -61  6
Jamaica  45  39  -13  11
Mexico  60  51.75  -14  2
Morocco  68  49  -28  3
Nicaragua  4  2  -50  55
Nigeria  55  28  -49  9
Panama  73  21  -67  8
Peru  19  6  -68  29
Philippines  57  53.5  -6  3
Poland  53  42  -21  3
Romania  92  85.5  -7  2
Senegal  70  40  -43  5
Sudan  10  2  -80  290
Turkey  97  98  1  1
Uruguay  63  60  -5  3
Venezuela  79  55.5  -30  2
Yugoslavia  84  45  -46  3
Zaire  25  19  -24  18
Data  Source:  Salomon  Brothers.
Note. The  mean  relative  spread  is  calculated  as the  mean  of the
difference  between  the  ask  and  bid  prices  divided  by the  bid  price.













Note.  ARR is  a dummy  for  commercial  bank  arrears.
PD/GNP  is  public  debt  as a percentage  of GNP
GNPGROWTH  is  the  growth  rate  of real  GNP.
SE is  standard  error  of regression  of the  bid
price  on linear  time  trend.
The secondary  market  prices  are  a cross-section  for  June  9,
1988.  Parentheses  indicate  t-statistics.
38Table  7.  Debt  swaps  1984  - 1988  (millions  of U.S.  $).
1984"  1985a  1986a  1987" 19 87 b  1988a*
Debt  Conversionsa
Argentina  31  469  750  338
Brazil  731  537  176  380  1250  2708
Bolivia  349
Chile  324  987  1983  3500  583
Costa  Rica  7  92
Ecuador  125  102
Honduras  6
Jamaica  1  102
Mexico  416  1804  4750  3670
Peru  15
Poland  150
Philippines  15  266 : 450  635
Venezuela  650  300
Other  500
Total  762  1330  1601  4710  8837
Debt  Swapsb  2000  4000  7000  12000  350000
Note. *  January - June 1988.
a. Debt  for  equity  or domestic  debt  swaps  and  debt  repurchases.
b. Debt  swaps,  all  transactions,  including  interbank
transactions.
c.  Estimate  for  all  of 1988.
Source: Financial  Flows  to  Developing  Countries,  Quaterly  Review,
September  1988,  World  Bank.
39Table  8.  Debt swaps  as  percentages  of bank  claims  on
- the  debtor  country  1984  - 1988.
1984-  1985a  1986'  1987'  1987b  1988'*
Debt  Conversions'
Argentina  0.1  1.6  2.3  1.0
Brazil  1.0  0.7  0.2  0.5  1.5  3.3
Bolivia  56.8
Chile  2.3  7.0  14.4  26.4  4.4
Costa  Rica  0.8  16.9
Ecuador  2.4  2.0
Honduras
Jamaica  0.2  20.3
Mexico  0.6  ,0  6.3  4.9
Peru  0.3
Poland
Philippines  0.1  2.0  3..'  4.7
Venezuela  2.6  1.2
Note.  *  January  - June  1988.
a. Debt  for  equity  or  domestic  debt  swaps  and  debt  repurchases.
b. Debt  swaps,  all  transactions,  including  interbank
transactions.
Sources:  as  Table  7;  Debt  data  applied  to  1987  and  1988  volume  data  is
for  the  third  quarter  of  1987  from  the  BIS,  Quaterly  Release.
40Table  9.  The  LDC  exposure  of  U.S.  commercial  banks:
*a  treand  towards  more  public  sector  debt
(billions  of  U.S.  $).
End  1982
Public  Private  Total
Top 9  Banks  33.3  48.7  82.0
All  Other  banks  11.8  34.5  46.3
Total  45.1  83.2  128.3
Mid  1985
Public  Private  Total
Top  9  Banks  40.1  41.2  81.3
All Other  banks  18.3  25.8  44.1
Total  58.4  67.0  125.4
End  1987
Public  Private  Total
Top 9 Banks  42.6  24.5  67.1
All  Other  banks  17.7  15.4  33.1
Total  60.3  39.9  100.2
Source:  Federal  Financial  Institutions  Examinations  Council,  "Country
Exposure Lending  Survey." End-1982  data  from  statistical  release  of
June  1, 1983,  Hid 1985  data  from  statistical  release  of  October  15,
1984;  Mid  1985  data  from  statistical  release  of November  6, 1985.  End
1987  data  from  statistical  release  of  April  22,  1988.
Exposures  are  by residence  of  borrower. LDC  exposure  is  calculated  as
the  sum  of exposures  to  Opec,  Non-oil  Latin  America,  Non-oil  Asia,  and
Non-oil  Afria.
41Table  10.  LDC  exposure  of large  U.S.  banks  at year-end  1987.
LDC  exposure  LDC  exposure LDC  exposure/  LDC  exposure
(millions  as  percentage  primary  net  of loan
of dollars) of assets  capital  loss  reserve/
shareholders'
equity
Citicorp  13,300  6.5  0.79  1.13
BankAmerica  Corp.  10,000  10.8  1.24  2.45
Chase  Manhattan  8,600  8.7  1.12  1.71
Man. Hanover  8,900  12.1  1.45  2.63
J.P.  Morgan  & Co.  5,400  7.2  0.74  0.81
Chemical  NY  5,904  7.6  0.97  1.51
Security  Pacific  2,200  3.0  0.39,  0.36
First  Interstate  1,359  2.7  0.36  0.34
Bankers  Trust  NY  4,000  7.1  0.80  1.04
First  Chicago  2,900  6.6  0.75  0.98
Source:  Review  of Bank  Performance,  Salomon  Brothers,  1988  edition.
42Table  11.  LDC  loan  loss  reserves  and  charge-offs
for  major  U.S.  banks  at  year-end  1987.
LDC  reserve  total  LDC  LDC  loan  Charge
established  in  loan  loss  loss  -off
2Q  4Q  reserve  reserve  in 1987
(millions)  (millions)  coverage  (millions)
(per  c.)
Citicorp  3,000  3,325  25  214
BankAmerica  Corp.  1,100  - 2,004  20  234
Chase  Manhattan  1,600  - 2,000  25  78
Man. Hanover  1,703  - 1,787  22  63
J.P.  Morgan  & Co.  850  1,330  25  149
Chemical NY  1,100  - 1,360  25  21
Security  Pacific  558  350  980  54  78
First  Interstate  500  180  612  54  150
Bankers Trust NY  700  - 1,OO0  25  55
First  Chicago  780  240  1,132  39  91
Source:  Review  of  Bank  Performance,  Salomon  Brothers,  1988  Edition.
43Table  12.  Asset  value  regression  results.
Date  Constant  Exp/Assets  R2 N
November  30,  1987  0.998  -0.541  0.33  41
(232.50)  (-4.36)
May 31,  1988  1.007  -0.617  0.36  41
(222.99)  (-4.63)
Note.  The  dependent  variable  is the  sum  of the  market  value  of common
stock  and  the  book  values  of  preferred  stock  and  total  liabilities,
divided  by total  assets,  computed  as the  sum  of Wook  assets  and  loan
loss  reserves. Exp/Assets  stands  for  exposure  to  Argentina,  Brazil,
Chile,  Mexico  and  Venezuela  divided  by assets,  calculated  as
mentioned. Parentheses  indicate  t-statistics.
44Table  13.  Income  taxes  paid  by major  U.S.  banks.
income  taxes  income
paid  taxes  paid/
1983 - 1987  LDC eirosure
(millions)
Citicorp  3,337  0.25
BankAmerica  Corp.  594  0.06
Chase  Hanhattan  741  0.09
Han.  Hanover  708  0.08
J.P.  Morgan  & Co.  1,457  0.27
Chemical  NY  353  0.16
Security  Pacific  461  0.34
Bankers  Trust  NY  597  0.15
First  Chicago  223  0.08
Source:  Review  of  Bank  Performance,  Salomon  Brothers,  1988  Edition.
45Table  14.  Market  capitalizations  large  U.S.  banks.
Market  value  of  LDC  exposure/
of common  stock  market  value
(millions)
Citicorp  7,508  1.77
BankAmerica  Corp.  1,701  5.88
Chase  Manhattan  2,189  3.93
Man.  Hanover  1,408  6.32
J.P.  Morgan  & Co.  6,547  0.82
Chemical  NY  1,581  3.73
Security  Pacific  3,829  0.57
First  Interstate  2,121  0.64.
Bankers  Trust  NY  2,607  1.53
First  Chicago  1,520  1.91
Note.  Bank  market  value  is  calculated  as the  product  of the  stock
price  at  May 31,  1988  and  the  number  of stocks  outstanding  at  year-end
1987. Data  source:  Review  of Bank  Performance,  Salomon  Brothers,  1988
Edition.
46Table  15.  Simulations  of  cash  sales  of LDC loans  by U.S.  banks.
Case  1: 34  per  cent  tax.  Case  2:  20  per  cent  tax.
change  int  critical  change  in  critical
stock  price  discount  stock  price  discount
Citicorp  14  - 2  -
BankAmerica  Corp.  47  88  6  72
Chase Manhattan  31  - 4  83
Man.  Hanover  51  86  6  71
J.P Morgan  &  Co.  7  - 1  -
Chemical NY  30  - 4  84
Security Pacific  5  - 1  -
First  Interstate  5  - 1  -
Bankers Trust NY  12  - 2  -
First  Chicago  15  - 2  -
Case  3: 15  per  cent  tax.  Case  4:  0  per cent  tax.
change  in  critical  change  in  critical
stock  price  discount  stock  price  discount
Citicorp  -3  - -16  97
BankAmerica  Corp.  -9  bs  -53  58
Chase  Manhattan  -6  78  -35  66
Man.  Hanover  -9  67  -57  57
J.P  Morgan  &  Co.  -1  - -7  -
Chemical  NY  -6  80  -34  68
Security Pacific  -1  - -5  -
First Interstate  -1  - -6  -
Bankers Trust NY  -2  - -14  -
First Chicago  -3  - -17  93
47Table  16.  Excess  return  regression.
C  BRA  OH-'R  R2 N
0.042  0.612  -0.247  0.17  39
(1.09)  (2.18)  (-1.70)
The dependent  variable  is  the  percentage  stock  price
appreciation  minus  the  bank's  beta  times  the  percentage
appreciation  of the  S  & P 500  stock  index.
BRA is  exposure  to  Brazil  divided  by shareholders'  equity.
OTHER  is exposure  to  Argentina,  Chile,  Mexico  and  Venezuela
divided  by shareholders'  equity. Parenitheses  indicate
t-  statistics
48Table  17.  Exposure  to  Mexico  of 5 top  banks  as  percentage
of creditor  bdnkiug  system's  total  exposure  to  Mexico.
date
United  Kingdom  69  12/86
Japan  39  6/86
Canada  91  12/84
France  78  12/86
West-Germany  64  9/86
United  States  42  12/87
Date source:  World  Bank. For  each  of the  cduntries  the  tops
banks  are those  mentioned  in  Table  18.  Among  the  5  French  banks
are  Credit  Agricole  and  Indosuez.
49Table  18.  Exposure  of  major  to top  banks  in  major  creditor  nations
to  Mexico  and  Brazil.
equity  Hex.  exposure  Bra.  + Mex.exposure
as  perc.  of  as  perc.  of  as perc.  of
assets  assets  equity  assets equity
United  Kingdom
Lloyds  Bank  5.3  1.9  35.5  4.5  86.2
Barclays  Group  4.7  0.8  16.1  1.3  26.8
Midland  Bank  4.0  2.1  52.5  4.4  110.5
National  Westminster  5.6  0.6  10.8  1.2  20.5
Standard  Chartered  0.6  1.1  26.2  -
average  4.7  1.3  28.2  2.9  61.0
Japan
Bank  of Tokyo  2.5  1.0  40.2  1.8  71.8
Sumitomo  Bank  2.3  0.4  18.9  0.8  32.8
Dai-Ichi  Kangyo  Bank  2.0  0.3  17.0  - -
Sanwa  Bank  2.2  0.4  8.6  - -
Mitsubishi  2.4  0.4  14.7  0.7  29.7
average  2.3  0.5  21.8  1.1  44.8
Canada
Bank  of Montreal  3.6  2.2  61.3  4.6  130.0
Royal  Bank  4.2  1.7  41.6  3.4  81.8
Scotiabank  3.9  1.4  35.6  2.5  62.3
Canadian  Imperial  4.2  1.3  31.6  2.9  68.6
Toronto  Dominion  5.8  1.2  21.0  2.3  39.6
France  4.3  1.6  38.2  3.1  76.5
Societe  General  2.9  1.3  43.2  - -
Banque  National  de P.  2.4  0.9  41.2  - -
Credit  Lyonnais  2.4  0.9  37.1  - -
average  2.6  1.0  40.5  - -
50Wast-Germany
Dresdner  Bank  3.2  0.7  22.1
West Landesbank  2.9  0.9  32.4
Commerzbank  2.8  0.5  18.6
Deutsche  Bank  4.0  0.2  5.3
Bayer.  Landesbank  2.4  0.4  14.6
average  3.1  0.5  18.6
United  States
Citicorp  4.3  1.3  29.5  3.4  78.3
BankAmerica  3.5  2.7  76.9  5.6  159.7
Chase  Manhattan  3.9  1.7  43.4  4.4  114.5
Man.  Hanover  3.7  2.6  71.3  5.5  149.6
J.P.  Morgan  6.7  1.6  23.8  4.1  61.6
average  4.4  2.0  49.0  4.6  112.7
Sources:  World  Bank;  1986  annual  reports  of French  banks,  and  of  West
Landesbank  and  Bayerische  Landesbank;  July  5, 1988  issue  of Commercial
Banks,  Salomon  Brothers;  Review  of  Bank  Performance,  Salomon  Brothers,
1988  Edition.
51Table  19.  Creditor  banks'  exposure  and  market  capitalization.
Market  Capitalization  Exposure  to  Mexico
(billions  of  and  Brazil/  Market
U.S.  dollars)  Capitalization
United  Kingdom
Lloyd  Bank  2.5  1.4
Barclays  Group  4.5  0.4
Midland  Bank  2.0  2.0
National  Westminster  4.4  0.4
Japa:&
Bank  of Tokyo  22.2  0.1
Sumitomo  Bank  64.5  0.0
Mitsubishi  Bank  53.5  0.0
Canada
Bank  of  Montreal  2.3  1.4
Royal  Bank  3.1  0.9
Scotiabank  1.9  0.8
Canadian  Imperial  3.1  0.7
Toronto  Dominion  3.9  0.3
United  States
Citicorp  7.5  0.9
BankAmerica  1.7  3.1
Chase  Manhattan  2.2  2.0
Man.  Hanover  1.4  2.9
J.P.  Morgan  6.5  2.0
Sources:  World  Bank;  Company  annual  reports;  July 5, 1988  issue  of
Commercial  Banks,  Salomon  Brothers;  Review  of  Bank  Performance,
Salomon  Brothers,  1988  Edition.
52Table  20.  Selected  industrial  countries: regulation  regarding
comnercial  bank  provisioning  against  claims  on  developing
countries  at end  1987.
Level  of  Mandatory  Tax  Deductability  Gear-
Provisioning 1 Provisioning  of Provisioning  ability 2
Canada  30-40  Yes; 30  percent  to  Yes  No
40  percent  against  a
basket  of 34 countries
France  30-40  No 3 Yes;  but for  Yes
provisioning  in
excess  of average
provisions  on a
case-by-case
basis.
Germany  30-70  No4  Yes;  but case-by-  No
case.
Japan  5  Yes;  1 percent  to  Yes;  but limited  Part-
5  percent  for  36  to 1  percent  of  1y 5
countries  rescheduled  debt
and increased
exposure.
Switz.  30-50  Yes; 30  percent  Yes;  but for  pro-  No
against  a group  of  visioning  in
countries.  excess  of manda-
tory  provision  on
a  casa-by-case
basis.
U. K.  25-35  Bank  of England  guide-  Yes; 80  percent  No
line:  5  percent  to  of the  provisioning
100  percent  depending  value  derived  from
on country.  Bank  of England
matrix.
U. S.  25-606  No 7 No7  Yes
Sources  of this  table: IMF  document.
l/ In  percentage  of relevant  exposure;  numbers  indicate  ranges  for
major  banks.
2/ Indicates  whether  provisions  are included  in the  capital  base  used
for  monitoring  capital  asset  ratio's.
3/  Provisioning  suggested  against  a number  of countries  with  payments
difficulties.
534/ Adequacy  judged  against  industry  average.
5/  Only the  nontex-deductible  portion  is included.
6/ Some  regional  U.S.  banks  have  substantially  higher  provisions.
7/ Except  when loans  are  determined  "value-impaired."
541.  From  internal  World  Bank  document.
2.  See  Watkins  (forthcoming)  for  a  discussion  of some  of the  factors  that
have influenced  bank lending  to  the  developing  countries  in  the  1970s  and 1980s.
3. Financial  Times,  January  21,  1988.
4. Financial  Times,  October  19,  1987  and  February  4, 1988.
5.  Wall Street  Journal,  October  7, 1987.
6.  The  data in  Table  9 is  gathered  by the  Federal  Financial  Institutions
Examination  Council  and  is  on a consolidated  basis. It differs  from  the
data  on developing  country  exposure  of  US banks  in  Table  (3),  which  is  on a
non-consolidated  basis  and  collected  by the  U.S.  Treasury.
7.  As an  accounting  rule,  provisioning  for  loan  loss  reserves  involves  a
balance  sheet  transfer  from  shareholders'  equity  to the  loan  loss  reserve.
Thus  by taking  LDC  exposure  net  of the  loan  loss  reserve,  the  measures  of
LDC  exposure  and  of bank  equity  are  both  net  of previous  reserving,  and
double  counting  is  avoided.
8. Sachs  and  Kyle (1984]  use  a slightly  different  specification  to  analyze
the  links  of stock  market  prices  and  LDC  debt  for  data  through  the  third
quarter  of 1933.
9.  Except  for  the  stock  price  information,  the  two  regressions  use the  same
data  which  is  mostly  for-year-end  1987. Some  data  on  numbers  of stocks
outstanding  are from  Keefe  and  Bruyette's  January  18,  1988  newsletter.
10.  All  LDC  exposure  is  computed  as the  sum  of exposures  to  OPEC  and  non-
OPEC  Africa,  Asia  and  Latin  America.
11.  As pointed  out  by Buynak  [19871,  the  effective  tax  rate  for  banks  may
actually  have  been  raised  by the  1986  tax  reform  act,  as  banks  now face
tighter  restrictions  on foreign  tax  offsets,  a higher  alternative  minimum
tax  at 20  per  cent,  and  reduced  net-operating  loss  carry-back  from  10  years
previously  to 3  years  now.
12.  General  operating  losses  can  instead  be carried  back for  3  years  and
carried  forward  for  15  years.
13.  The  numbers  for  Exp/MV  in  the  table  are  quite  large  as they  divide  the
book  value  of  LDC loans,  which  have  hardly  been  written  down  so far,  by a
stock  market  measure  which  already  reflects  LDC  loan  discounting.
14.  In the  U.S  bank  closure  decisions  are  made  by the  Comptroller  of the
Currency.
5515.  Financial  Times,  December  7, 1987.
16.  From  "Indicative  prices  for  less  developed  coucntry  bank loans,"  Salomon
Brothers.
17.  Financial  Times,  February  4, 1988.
18.  Data is  from  national  governments.
19.  These  relative  equity  figures,  however,  do  not reveal  hidden  bank
resources,  such  as the  unrealized  real  estate  and  stock  gains  that  are
nowhere  to  be found  on the  balance  sheets  of  Japanese  banks.
20.  New  York  Times,  July 20,  1988.
21.  The information  in  this  paragraph  is from  pp.  24,  80,  and 127  of
Mullineux  [1987].
22.  Wall Street  Journal,  January  26,  1988.  The  only  other  occasion  where
Japanese  banks  were  allowed  to  deduct  loan  losses  was at the  creation  of an
off-shore  factoring  company  that  concentrated  some  of the  Mexican  exposure
of  Japanese  banks.
23.  The  countries  are  Belgium,  Britain,  Canada,  France,  Italy,  Japan,
Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  the  United  States  and  West
Germany.
24.  See 'Financial  Flows  to  Developing  Countries,  Quaterly  Review,'
September  1988.  p.  4.
25.  Wall Street  Journal,  September  30,  1987.
26.  New  York  Times,  July  13,  1988.
27.  Wall  Street  Journal,  September  30,  1987.
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